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ABSTRACT: 
In  recent  years,  a  period of  exceptional  expansion  of  the  Labour  supply, 
the  USA  and  EC-countries  have  experienced  markedly  different  rates  of  job 
creation.  The  purpose  of  this  paper  is to  throw  Light  upon  this  develop-
ment.  Considered  in  terms  of  new  jobs  created  the  differences  between  the 
American  and  European  performances  in this  regard  have  been  remarkable. 
Thus,  the  USA  was  able  to  create 15  million  new  jobs  from  1973  to 1981,  a 
period  when  the  Community  as  a  whole  exp~rienced a  slight fall  in employ-
ment.  Further substantial  reductions  occurred  in  1982  and  1983.  The  slow-
down  of  real  growth  since  1973  cannot  explain this  divergent  performance, 
since  the  US  average  growth  rate of  real  GDP  has  been  only  slightly higher 
than  in  Europe.  The  overall  real  growth  rate  in  the  USA  between  1973  and 
1981  was  achieved  almost  exclusively  through  an  increase  in employment; 
the  measured  level  of  total  Labour  productivity  remained  virtually un-
changed.  In  contrast,  the  slowdown  in  the  growth  of  Labour  productivity was 
much  less  pronounced  in  most  of  the  EC  countries  after 1973,  especially  in 
manufacturing  which  still represents  27%  of  total  employment.  The  European 
countries  - more  exposed  to external  pressures  than  the  USA  - seem  to  have 
maintained their competitiveness  through  a  marked  shedding  of  Labour,  so  as 
to achieve  a  high  rate of  Labour  productivity.  Even  in a  period of  slow 
growth  the  USA  succeeded  in  creating employment  in  the  service sector, 
which  shows  in general  much  slower  productivity  improvements  than  in  manu-
facturing.  The  European  countries  suffered  from  a  Large  reduction  of  employ-
ment  in agriculture and  manufacturing  and  offset  this  by  only  a  modest  rise 
in  service employment,  i.e.  half  the  US  rate.  Part  of  the  explanation  for 
the  insufficient  employment  performance  in  Europe  is found  in  the  very dif-
ferent  wage  adjustment  process,  and  a  different  response  to  the  slowdown  in 
productivity growth  and  the  marked  deterioration of  the  terms  of  trade 
caused  by  the various  supply-side  shocks.  The  US  tendency  towards  rigid 
nominal  wages  led  to stagnant  real  wage  levels  in  the  1970s.  In  contrast 
real  wage  increase  hardly  diminished  in most  European  countries until  after 
1975.  After  the  second oil  shock  the  growth  of  real  wages  slowed  further 
or  even  fell  partly as  a  response  to high  and  rising unemployment.  Large 
real  wage  gaps  can  help to explain  the  decline  in profitability since  the 
early 1970s  but  they  fail  to account  for  the  sharp  jump  in  unemployment 
since  1980  in  most  countries.  Other  factors  must  be  taken  into  considera-
tion:  changing  exchange  rate  regimes,  the  growing  instability of  trade  and 
financial  relations  as  well  as  the  somewhat  contractory monetary  and  budge-
tary policies  put  into effect after  the  second oil price  shock.  This  multi-
plicity of  factors  makes  it extremely difficult to disentangle  that  part of 
unemployment  due  to demand  deficiency  and  that  due  to structural  problems 
in  the  labour  market.  The  problem  of  inadequate  wage  adjustment  was  further 
compounded  by  the  insufficiently flexible  relative  wage  structure as  be-
tween  countries,  sectors  and  occupations.  Because  of  indexation  and  other 
regulations  the  move  was  towards  greater wage  equality  in  many  European 
countries,  so  delaying  important  structural  changes. I 
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I  INTRODUCTION 
Unemployment  has  become  the  central  economic  policy  issue  in all  the 
Western  industrialized countries,  having  climbed  dramatically  almost  every-
where  in  the  last  ten years.  Unemployment  rates  in  the  United  States  and  in 
the  European  Community  stood at  more  than  10  % of  the  labour  force  in mid-
1982  and  are still rising.  A superficial  comparison  of  unemployment  rates 
might  suggest  that  the  problems  and  hence  also  the  causes  of  rising  unem-
ployment  are  identical or at  least  similar.  Yet  even  an  initial  confronta-
tion of  the  trends  of  labour  supply,  employment  and  overall  economic  trends 
reveals  large differences  between  the  industrialized countries. 
Between  1973  and  1981,  more  than  15  million  jobs  were  created  in  the 
United  States, equivalent  to an  average  annual  increase of  2  %.  In  the  Com-
munity,  the  numbers  in  employment  in  1982  has  fallen  back  to their 1961 
level  and  will  probably  decline  further.  Less  than  half  of  the  employment 
growth  in  the  United  States  since  1973  would  have  been  sufficient  in  Europe 
to substantially ease  the  unemployment  problem.  For  example,  annual  employ-
ment  growth  of  1  % in  the  Community  from  1973  to  1981  would  have  meant  some 
8  1/2 million extra  jobs,  while  there  was  in  fact  a  7  1/2 million  increase 
in  the  number  of  jobless. 
Japan  is nowadays  often  held  up  as  an  unattainable  model  for  a  suc-
cessful  high  employment  policy.  Its unemployment  rate of  just  under  2  % 
has  doubled  compared  with  the  1960s.  Under  similar  circumstances,  some  small 
European  industrialized countries,  like Austria,  Norway  and  Switzerland, 
have  also managed  to  hold  their unemployment  rate to under  2%  from  1974 
until  very  recently.  The  European  Community  by  contrast  has  seen  a  three-
fold  or  four-fold  increase  in  its unemployment  rate  compared  with  the 
1960s.  In  some  member  countries,  the deterioration  in  the  labour  market 
situation has  been  even  worse  and  has  recently  accelerated  rapidly  <see 
table 1). 
The  facts  on  employment  trends  in  the  United  States,  Japan,  Austria 
and  the  member  countries  of  the  European  Community  are  presented  in  Chapter 
II, with  descriptions  of  the  main  sectoral  trends.  Chapter  III  attempts 
to  analyse  the  relationship between  growth,  productivity  increases  and -7-
employment  growth.  Chapter  IV  investigates  the  influence of  real  wages, 
wage  costs  and  relative  wage  structures  on  the  trend of  employment.  The 
final  chapter  draws  a  number  of  economic  policy  conclusions  from  experience 
in  the  industrialized countries  examined. T
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II  EMPLOYMENT  TRENDS  IN  THE  MAJOR  INDUSTRIALIZED  COUNTRIES 
The  United  States 
The  employment  trend  in  the  United  States  since  the first oil crisis 
has  continued  a  pattern already  established  in  the  1950s  and  1960s.  During 
the  last  twenty  years,  employment  in  the  United  States  rose  by  an  annual 
average  of  some  2%  to  stand at  more  than  100  million  in  1980.  In  absolute 
terms,  the  number  of  employed  persons  rose  by  an  annual  average  of  around 
1,5 million  from  1960  to 1973  and  by  an  annual  1,9 million  from  1973  to 
1981.  This  upward  trend  has  begun  to  ease off  only  recently.  Total  employ-
ment  declined  by  1  % in  1982  (the first  fall  since  1975). 
The  main  trends  in  the  United  States  in  the eight  years  from  1973 
onwards  are  as  follows  (see also tables  1  and  2): 
civilian employment  increased  by  15,3 million,  i.e.  2%  annually; 
the  decline  in  the  numbers  employed  in agriculture  (which  had  been  evident 
since  the  1950s  and  1960s)  came  to  a  halt  in  the  early 1970s; 
the  total  of  more  than  15  million  new  jobs  was  created  predominantly 
in  the  service and  the  government  sector,  since  employment  in  manufacturing 
industry  has  more  or  less  stagnated since  1969;  by  contrast,  employment  in 
mining  and  construction  increased  by  almost  0,7 million,  with  the  result 
that  overall  industrial  employment  has  still risen  annually  by  some  1  % 
since  1973  (according  to  survey  data). 
Employment  trends  in  manufacturing  industry will  not  be  analysed  in 
any  great detail  here.  Manufacturing  employment  practically stopped  growing 
at  the  end  of  the  1960s  and  suffered declines  in  1971  and  1975  which  were 
reversed  in  the  following  years.  Its  level  in  1981  was  the  same  as  in  1969. 
This  virtual  stagnation masks  a  multiplicity of  declining  and  expanding 
industries.  Industries  with  vigorously  expanding  employment  since  1973  are 
plastic products,  electronic  components,  and  medical  and  dental  instruments 
(annual  rates  of  increase  ranging  between  4  % and  6  %),  with  increases  also 
in  machine  tools, aircraft,  pharmaceuticals  and  printing products.  Employ-
ment  in  mining  has  been  increasing  again  since  the  early 1970s,  thanks  to 
higher  coal  production  and  the  creation of  new  jobs  in  the oil and  natural 1
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gas  industries  (though  production  there  has  not  gone  up).  Employment 
growth  in  construction  was  maintained until  1979  but  has  since declined 
again  <see  table 3). 
The  United  States  has  steadily become  a  service  society~  A total of 
\ 
70  % of all  jobs  in 1981  was  accounted  for  by  the  private and  government 
service sectors.  From  1973  to  1981,  the  number  of  jobs  in  these  sectors 
increased  by  2,7 % annuall~Breaking  down  the private service sector  into 
30  service  industries allows  us  to  identify the  industries  which  actually 
made  the  running  in  the  creation of  new  jobs  in the  1970s  1•  The  industries 
with  rapid  employment  growth  in  the  period  1973-81  were  the  following  <see 
also table 4): 
Table  4  - Employment  growth  in  some  services,  1973-1981  United  States 
Increase  1973-1981, 
Numbers  employed  annual 
Sector  in  1981  average 
<in 
<millions)  thousands)  (in %) 
Professional  services  2  022  775  2.8 
Business  services  3  605  1  426  6.5 
Banks,  credit  institutions,  4  443  1  064  3.5  insurance 
Real  estate  1  373  300  3.1 
Eating  and  drinking  places  6  671  2  044  4.7 
Hospitals,  doctors,  medical  5  948  1  934  5.0  services 
Amusement  and  recreation  1  127  240  3.0  services 
Educational  services  1  798  469  3.9 
Total  26  987  8  252  4.7 
1  The  employment  figures  broken  down  by  economic  sectors  <tables  3  and 
4)  are  based  on  establishment  data.  All  the  other  figures  are  taken  from 
<monthly)  household  surveys. -13-
From  1973  to 1981,  these eight  sectors experienced  an  annual  in-
crease of  between  4%  and  5  %,  thus  creating more  than  8  million  new  jobs, 
i.e.  almost  60%  of  the  employment  growth  in  the service sector  (including 
government).  The  wholesale  and  retail  trades  provided  another  2,3 million 
new  jobs  and  the  government  sector  <excluding  the  armed  forces)  about 
2 million. 
The  move  towards  a  "service society"  has  been  less evident  in  the 
United  States  in  those  service sectors which  are  linked  with  the  production 
of  goods  in  the  traditional  sense  <transport,  the  wholesale  and  retail 
trades).  The  exceptions  are air transport,  the  banking  and  real  estate sec-
tors,  and  business  and  professional  services.  The  professional  service sec-
tor provides  a  number  of  very  different  functions,  such  as  legal  auditing, 
bookkeeping,  accounting,  engineering  and  architectural  services.  The  busi-
ness  service sector,  which  includes  personnel  supply,  janatorial and  pro-
tective services, data-processing,  leasing  and  similar services,  is also 
reflecting the  growing  transfer to specialized service enterprises of acti-
vities that  used  to be  performed  largely  by  industry. 
Looking  at  the  long-term  trend  to  the  mid-1970s,  the  government  sec-
tor  made  an  above-average  contribution to  employment  growth  (annual  increase 
of  some  3,9%  from  1960  to 1975).  Between  1960  and  1981,  civilian public 
employment  increased  by  7,2  million  persons.  In  1960,  11  %of  total  civi-
lian employees  worked  for  some  level  of  government  (excluding  government 
enterprises)  and  this proportion  had  risen  by  1981  to 14,4  %.  The  increase 
in  employment  took  place  largely at  state and  local  government  levels, 
which  benefited  from  the  rapid  expansion  of  welfare,  health  and  education 
programmes.  Since  1975  this trend  has  been  reversed.  Since  1981  employment 
in  the  government  sector  has  contracted as  a  result  of  the  cutbacks  imposed 
by  the  Reagan  administration  2 
What  might  be  the  future  pattern  in  the  1980s?  The  Bureau  of  Labor 
Statistics  recently  updated  its  long-term projections of  growth  and  employ-
ment  up  to 1990  3•  These  show  that, particularly after 1985,  the  growth  of 
the  labour  supply  will  slow  down.  Assuming  an  annual  real  growth  rate  for 
2  See  Tucker  <1981). 
3 
See  Saunders  and  Personick  <1982),  in:  US  Department  of  Labour, 
Economic  Projections  to 1990,  March  1982,  Washington. -14-
gross  domestic  product  of  2,5  % in  the  1980s  (slow  growth  scenario),  the 
total  number  of  employed  persons  could  grow  by  1,5 % annually,  equivalent 
to 1,6 million  jobs  a  year.  As  in  the  1960s  and  1970s,  private services 
will  show  the  largest  increase  in employment  (2,0%  annual  growth  in 
1979-90),  with  the  best  performance  once  again  in  health,  eating  and  drink-
ing  places  and  retailing.  However,  the  Bureau  also projects  employment  in-
creases  in  manufacturing  industry and  construction.  Employment  in the 
government  sector,  by  contrast,  is expected  to grow  more  slowly.  More 
favourable  growth  performance  could  produce  even  more  rapid  increases  in 
employment  (2,1  % a  year). 
Japan 
The  increase  in  the  numbers  employed  in  Japan  was  less  marked  than 
in  the  United  States,  but  none  the  less  amounted  to an  average  of  around 
1,3% a  year  from  1960  to 1973,  or  some  630  000  annually). 
In  contrast  to experience  in  the  United  States,  the  annual  growth 
rate of  the  employed  labour  force  in  Japan  has  been  almost  halved  since 
1973  compared  with  the  1960s.  The  following  trends  may  be  discerned 
(see  table 5): 
the  share of  employment  in agriculture  in  Japan  is still as  high  as 
10  %;  the drift  from  agriculture  has  slowed  down  distinctly, and  other 
sectors, especially  industry,  have  stopped  absorbing  labour; 
the  numbers  employed  in  industry  (including  construction)  have  been 
static, while  manufacturing,  which  now  provides  some  25%  of  total employ-
ment,  reduced  its work  force  after the first oil crisis by  some  1  million 
and  has  since  increased it only  marginally; 
the  expansion  of  the  service sector  continued  in  the  1970s,  slowing 
down  only  a  little compared  with  the  period  1960-73. 
The  1974/75  recession did  not  affect  the  construction  sector  in 
Japan,  in  contrast  to developments  in  most  of  the  other  industrialized 
countries.  Employment  in  construction  has  continued  to  increase  since  1973, 
albeit at  only  half  the  rate of  the  period  1960-73. T
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The  first oil crisis produced  a  structural  break  in  Japanese  economic 
trends.  Economic  growth  before  1973  was  led  by  manufacturing  industry,  with 
rapid  growth  in  industrial  employment,  paralleling that  in  the  service sec-
tor.  This  growth  pattern  changed  after 1974.  Employment  in  manufacturing 
fell,  while  there  was  an  even  sharper  drop  in  hours  per  week.  The  structure 
of  employment  within  industry also shifted as  a  result  of  changes  in  the 
composition  of  demand.  Employment  fell  disproportionally  in  the  energy-
intensive  and  raw-material-dependent  sectors  such  as  steel, textiles,  fur-
niture  and  chemicals. 
The  employment  situation  in  manufacturing  began  to  recover  only  gra-
dually as  the  adjustment  process  triggered  by  the oil price  shock  got  under 
way.  Employment  slowly  picked  up  again  in  the  sectors  buoyed  up  by  the  ex-
port  boom.  But  the  bulk  of  the  adjustment  was  in  the  form  of  a  more  rapid 
increase  in  labour  productivity and  greater use  of  overtime,  part-time 
working  (particularly by  women>  and  subcontracting  through  small  and 
medium-sized  firms.  The  example  provided  by  the  employment  adjustment  pro-
cess  in  Japan  is  instructive,  but  one  which  the  Western  industrialized 
4  countries  can  hardly  imitate 
Despite its rapid  industriali-zation,  Japan  too  has  become  a  "service 
society".  In  1981,  almost  55  % of  the  employed  labour  force  were  working 
in  the  service sector  (including  government).  With  the earlier,  rapid de-
cline of  the agricultural  workforce,  employment  in  the  service sectors 
expanded,  and  this  continued at  a  steady  pace  even  in  the  1970s.  Two  dif-
ferences  may  be  observed  here  compared  with  the  United  States  and  the 
European  countries: 
the  wholesale  and  retail  trades  <including  restaurants)  provide  a 
disproportionally  large  share of  total  employment  in  Japan,  and  this  share 
continued  to  rise even  after 1973  <in  1981,  it was  22,8  %>;  in  Japan,  there 
are  almost  20  persons  employed  in distributive trades  to every  100  000  in-
habitants  <compared  with  10  to  every  100  000  inhabitants  in  the  United 
States>.  The  Japanese  distributive system,  unlike other  sectors of  industry, 
is "overmanned"  and  still  lacking  in efficiency,  but  it acts  as  an  important 
social  safety net  (family  business,  the elderly),  with  a  predominance  of 
self-employed  persons  and  unpaid  family  workers  (35  %of total  employment 
in  this sector>; 
4  See  Economic  Planning  Agency  <1979>  and  Ernst  (1980). (3) 
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employment  in  the  government  sector accounts  for  only  a  very  small 
proportion  (3,5  % in 1981)  of  total employment;  the  percentages  (excluding 
the  armed  forces)  in  the  United  States  and  in  the  Federal  Republic  of  Ger-
many  are  15  % and  13  %,  respectively;  this  low  level  of  employment  in the 
government  sector  is  largely due  to the  fact  that  public-sector welfare, 
social  security and  health  services  are  not  yet  very  highly  developed  in 
Japan,  their functions  being  performed  either by  households  or  by  large 
firms. 
Thus,  the  4,5  million  new  jobs  created  in  the  service sector  (inclu-
ding  government)  in  the  eight  years  since  1973  have  more  than offset  the 
decline  in  agriculture.  The  Largest  increases  were  in  "other services"  and 
in  "banking,  insurance,  real  estate".  The  high  proportion of  self-employed 
persons  (and  family  workers)  in  these  sectors  reflects  the  Large  number  of 
small  and  medium-sized  firms,  which  also still play  an  important  role  in 
the  industrial  sector.  There  are  a  number  of  indications  which  suggest  that 
employment  trends  in  the  service sector  have  been  much  Less  influenced  by 
the  growth  rate of  industry  since  1973  and  that  this pattern will  continue. 
Austria 
Only  four  relatively  small  industrialized  countries  in  Europe 
(Switzerland,  Norway,  Sweden  and  Austria)  managed  to maintain full  employ-
ment  in  the  crisis period  following  1973.  While  the  unemployment  rate  in 
the  European  Community  averaged  some  5,4  % in  the  period  1975  to 1980,  it 
did  not  rise above  its 1960s  Level  in  the  abovementioned  countries,  remain-
ing  at  under  2%  until  1980. 
Table  6  - Employment  performance  in selected countries,  1973-1981 
Austria  Norway  Sweden  Switzer- EC-10  Land 
Unemployment  1975-80  1.9  1.9  1.9  (0.4)  5.4 
rate  (a)  1981-82  3.0  2.3  2.8  (0.3)  8.8 
Total  employment  1975-79  0.9  2.3  0.7  -0.5  0.1  (annual  average 
growth  rate  1979-81  0.6  1.6  0.5  1.5  -1.5 
in  %) 
Source:  OECD,  Historical  Statistics 1960-1980 (Paris  1982) and  Labour  Force 
Statistics. 
(a)  As  a  percentage of  the  Labour  force  (standardized  OECD  figures). -18-· 
Each  of  these  countries  has  special  features  which  may  help  to 
"explain"  their success  in maintaining  full  employment  at  least until  the 
onset  of  the  current  recession.  The  example  of  Austria  will  be  analysed  in 
some  detail  here,  since it reveals  close parallels  to  the pattern  in  the 
United  States. 
As  in  the  case  of  the  Community  countries,  the  labour  supply  in 
Austria  has  increased  since  1974  (by  an  annual  average  of  1,5  % of  domestic 
employees.  At  the  same  time,  however,  there  was  in  Austria  a  steady  increase 
in  the  employed  Labour  force  <with  the exception of  1975)  and  an  even  shar-
per  increase  in  the  number  of  wage  and  salary earners  (some  0,4  % and  1  % 
a  year  respectively).  The  increase  in  the  demand  for  Labour  was  encouraged 
by  a  combination  of  factors,  including  the  demand  effects of  an  expansio-
nary  fiscal  policy,  large-scale  cuts  in  working  hours  <which  had  been  intro-
duced  on  social  policy  grounds  at  a  time  when  there  was  a  shortage  of 
Labour)  and  an  active  Labour  market  promotion  policy.  However,  the  service 
5  sector also made  an  important  contribution to  job  creation 
Despite  the  impact  of  the  1973  oil  crisis,  employment  in  industry 
did  not  begin  to decline  in Austria  until  1975.  However,  following  the 
sharp  drop  of  3,2 % which  occurred  in  1975,  it was  only  in 1977  that  the 
numbers  employed  in  industry  showed  any  major  improvement. 
Table  7  - Employment,  1960-1980  Austria 
Annual  rates  of  Percentage  share 
Sector  change  in  % 
1960-73  1974-80  1960  1973  1974  1980 
Agriculture  - 4.7  - 3.1  21.6  11.8  13.0  10.5 
Industry  +  0.3  0.0  40.5  42.5  41.1  40.3 
of  which: 
manufacturing  +  0.3  - 0.1  30.6  32.1  30.2  29.5 
Services  +  1.4a  +  2.1  37.9a  45.7a  46.0  49.2 
Total  - 0.1a  +  0.4  100.0a  100.0a  100.0  100.0 
Source:  1960-73  - OECD,  Historical  Statistics 1960-1980,  Paris  1982; 
1974-80  - OECD,  Labour  Force  Statistics 1969-1980,  Paris  1982. 
(a)  Excluding  the  armed  forces. 
5  See  Butschek  <1981  and  1982). -19-
The  number  of  wage  and  salary earners  in  the  service sector  con-
tinued  to  increase  even  during  the  period of  crisis.  The  annual  growth  of 
employment  in this sector  amounted  to  some  2,2  % from  1974  to 1981;  this 
increase  was  significantly steadier and  faster  than  in  the  Federal  Republic 
of  Germany,  for  example,  and  matched  that  in  the  United  States.  The  fastest 
expansion  in  employment  in  the  service sector was  in  educational  and  health 
services,  which  benefited  both  from  government  policies  and  from  tourism. 
Employment  also  increased at  an  above-average  rate  in  hotels  and  catering, 
legal  and  economic  services  and  in  banking  and  finance.  Public  services  and 
the distributive trades,  which  in 1979  provided  respectively  some  32  % and 
24  % of  jobs  in  the service sector, also  expanded  their work  force  by  2  % 
annually  (accounting  for  25%  of  the  increase  in  the  service sector). 
Austria evidently experienced  a  catching-up  process  in  the  development  of 
public  and  social  services once  the  sharp  growth  of  industry  eased off. 
The  unemployment  rate  in  Austria  showed  little or  no  increase  even 
in  the  years  of  declining or  weak  growth  (1975  and  1978).  Only  after  1981 
did  unemployment  begin  to  rise distinctly,  as  the  current  recession  spread 
to  Austria  and  labour  hoarding  could  no  longer  be  continued  <see  table 1). 
The  unemployment  rate  could  conceivably  reach  some  4,5  % of  the  dependent 
labour  force  in  1983.  The  increase  in  hidden  unemployment,  which  Butschek 
<1982,  p.  111)  estimated at 0,4%  for  1979,  has  also  in  recent  years  in-
dicated  growing  labour  market  problems.  In  Austria  too,  despite all the 
successes  of  employment  policy,  the question  which  is being  asked  with  in-
creasing  urgency  is whether  full  employment  can  be  maintained  in  the  future. 
As  in  the  past,  the  labour  supply  will  probably  grow  by  more  than  1  %an-
nually  up  to 1986  <an  annual  average  increase  of  some  30  000  persons),  as  a 
result  of  population structure  and  rising  female  activity  rates.  Only  after 
1986  will  the  growth  of  the  labour  supply  ease,  slowing  down  increasingly 
(by  1990,  it will  be  down  to only 0,3  %)  6 
The  Austrian  Institute for  Economic  Research  takes  the  view  that, 
assuming  otherwise  unchanged  conditions,  4  % annual  real  growth  would  be 
necessary  to  absorb  the  additional  labour  force  potential  in  the  medium 
term  (up  to 1986).  Various  simulations  of  labour  demand  in  the  1980s,  point 
to  a  further,  albeit  slower,  increase  in  the  total  number  of  employees  even 
6  Beirat  fur  Wirtschafts- und  Sozialfragen  <1980). -W-
in  the  event  of  slower  economic  growth.  With  economic  growth  of  2  1/2 % a 
year,  the  demand  for  labour  as  a  whole  and  for  employees  would  increase 
annually  by  only  some  0,4  % and  1  %,  respectively,  producing  an  excess 
supply  of  162  000  persons  in  1986,  equivalent  to an  unemployment  rate of 
5,4  %.  An  optimistic variant  assuming  3  1/2 % growth  would  result  in  a 
substantially  lower  over-supply  of  labour,  amounting  to 48  000  persons  in 
1986. 
The  countries  of  the  European  Community 
The  trend  in  the  Community  countries  followed  a  very different pat-
tern  from  that  in  the  United  States  and  Japan.  Total  employment  in  the  Com-
munity  of  Nine  stabilized during  the  1960s  at  around  102 million,  reached 
cyclical  a  peak  in  1974  ( 105 million),  which  was  exceeded  only  in  1979,  but 
dropped  in  1981  and  again  in  1982· 
In  the  period  1960-73,  countries  with  relatively  high  rates  of  growth 
in  total  employment  (Denmark,  the  Nethertands,  France  and  Belgium)  con-
trasted with  countries  where  there  was  a  decline  (Italy)  or  little or  no 
change  in  the  employed  labour  force  (Ireland,  the  Federal  Republic  of  Ger-
many  and  the  United  Kingdom).  In  the  period  1973-81,  the  growth  of  employ-
ment  slowed  down  generally or  became  negative.  There  were  two  exceptions: 
Italy,  which  reversed  its downward  trend,  and  Ireland,  where  stagnation  in 
the  level  of  employment  was  followed  by  marked  growth  <see  table 8). 
A comparison  with  the  United  States  reveals  sectoral  differences 
which  offer a  possible,  though  insufficient,  explanation  for  the  stagnation 
of  employment  in  Europe.  Industrial  employment  declined distinctly  in al-
most  all  the  member  countries,  while  in  the  United  States it increased  (up 
to 1980).  The  growth  of  employment  in  the  service  industries  in  the  Commu-
nity  in  the  period  1973-81  was  only  a  little over  half  that  in  the  United 
States,  with  the  share of  the  service sector itself being at  the  same  time 
smaller  in  the  Community  than  in  the  United  States. F
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The  national  averages  mask  sectoral differences  which  we  will  look 
at  only  briefly: 
the drift  from  agriculture  continued at  a  slower  pace;  it was  less 
rapid  in  those  member  countries  in  which  agriculture already  accounted  for 
a  low  proportion of  employment  (the  United  Kingdom,  the  Netherlands),  and 
was  due  almost  entirely to  a  drop  in  the  number  of  self-employed  and  Df  un-
paid  family  workers  who,  taking  the  Community  average,  still account  for 
70  % of  the  agricultural  work  force; 
the  decline  almost  everywhere  in  employment  in  the  secondary  sector 
was  due  largely  to manufacturing  industry,  the  main  countries  affected  here 
being  the  United  Kingdom,  Belgium  and  Denmark;  only  Italy and  above  all  Ire-
land  were  not  affected  by  the decline;  as  a  result  of  the  recession,  employ-
ment  in building  and  construction fell; 
employment  in  the tertiary sector  continued  to expand  in all  the 
member  countries,  with  the  sharpest  increases  being  in  Italy and  Ireland, 
and  the  lowest  increases  being  in  the  United  Kingdom  and  the  Federal  Repub-
lic of  Germany. 
A comparative  and  detailed analysis  of  the  trends  in manufacturing 
industry  by  member  country  would  go  beyond  the  objectives  of  this  investi-
gation  and  would  seem  to  be  of  only  limited  use  in  answering  the  question 
we  are  concerned  with  here.  Suffice it to  say  that,  in all the  Community 
countries,  employment  in  manufacturing  slumped  in  1974/75  and  the  numbers 
in  employment  continued  to decline  in  the  years  thereafter,  with  a  few 
exceptions.  Since  1981,  the fall  in  industrial  employment  has  become  shar-
per  in all  the  member  countries. 
A more  worthwhile  exercise  is to  look  at  the differences  in  employ-
ment  trends  in  the service sector  in  the  various  member  countries.  However, 
this  exercise  is  much  more  difficult, since  comparable  statistics are  not 
available at  a  sufficient  level  of detail.  Nevertheless,  the  rough  break-
down  in  table 9  7  is sufficient  to bring out  a  number  of  striking differen-
ces  for  the  period 1973-81: 
7  The  statistics of  table 8  are  not  directly  comparable  with  those  of 
table 9;  the  latter are of  more  recent  date  and  include  already  revisions 
for  the  F.R.  of  Germany.  The  tables  also  have  different  sources  <table  8: 
Social  statistics; table 9:  National  accounting). -23-
the  wholesale  and  retail  trade  (including  repair services):  stag-
nating  or declining  employment  in  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany,  Belgium, 
the  Netherlands  and  the  United  Kingdom; 
hotels  and  catering services:  low  rates  of  increase;  there was  a 
significant  increase only  in  Italy and  Belgium; 
transport  services:  a  fall  in  employment  in  the  Federal  Republic 
of  Germany  and  in ·the  United  Kingdom,  stagnation  in  the  Netherlands; 
communications:  slow  growth  in  employment  in  the  Federal  Republic 
of  Germany  and  stagnation  in  the  United  Kingdom;  strong growth  rates else-
where; 
banking  and  insurance:  vigorous  growth  in  employment,  though  here 
again  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  is  the  exception; 
"other market  services":  here  occurred  the  sharpest  increases  in 
employment; 
there  has  been  disproportionately  rapid growth  in the  government 
sector,  which  together  with  domestic  services  and  services  provided  by 
private non-profit  institutions account  for  some  16  % to  21  % of  total 
employment. T
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III  SLOWER  ECONOMIC  GROWTH,  REDUCED  PRODUCTIVITY  GAINS  AND  EMPLOYMENT 
Since  the early 1970s,  most  of  the  industrialized countries  have 
experienced  a  combination  of  rising  inflation  rates  and  high  unemployment. 
In  addition,  in  the  wake  of  the first oil crisis,  the  trend  rates  of  econo-
mic  growth  have  fallen dramatically  almost  everywhere.  In  the debate  on  the 
cau~es of  the  upsurge  in  employment,  the  main  blame  is usually  placed  on 
the  marked  decline  in  economic  growth.  It  is often  argued  that  unemployment 
cannot  be  brought  down  unless  we  manage  to  return  to the  rates  of  growth  in 
real  output  current  in  the  1960s.  While  there  is  no  doubt  a  positive  link 
between  economic  growth  and  employment,  the  latter  is also dependent  on 
other factors,  such  as  the  growth  of  labour  productivity,  sectoral  changes 
in  the  mise  of  economic  activity and  the  ways  in  which  work  and  working 
hours  are  organized. 
In  Japan,  Austria  and  the  United  States, at  least  in  the  period 
1973-81,  the  growth  rates of  total output  rose  faster  than  the  Community 
average.  But  this  in  no  way  provides  an  explanation  for  the difference  in 
employment  trends.  Whereas,  from  1973  to 1981,  real  GOP  in  the  United 
States  grew  only  3  % faster  in  aggregate  than  in  the  Community,  the  numbers 
employed  in  the  United  States  increased  by  17  %,  but  stagnated  in  the 
Community.  Similar disparities  between  economic  growth  and  employment 
growth  can  be  found  within  the  Community:  with  annual  growth  in  real  GOP 
averaging  2  % to  2,5  % (1973-1981),  the  employed  labour  force  declined  in 
the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  and  Belgium,  remained  broadly  unchanged  in 
France,  and  increased  in  Italy  <see  table  8). 
Real  economic  growth  and  productivity gains 
The  trend  of  productivity growth,  no  matter  how  this  concept  is de-
fined,  is a  reflection and  probably  an  important  causal  factor  in  these 
divergent  growth/employment  performances.  The  slowdown  in productivity 
growth  has  been  evident  in all  the  industrialized countries  since the first 
oil price  shock.  It has  cyclical  causes  (degree  of  capacity utilization), 
once-for-all  causes  (oil price  change)  and  longer-term  causes,  and  it 
followed  a  very  different  pattern  in  the  various  industrialized  countries. -26-
Table  10  - Real  GOP  per  man-hour  in  selected countries,  1950-81 
Diffe-
Annual  average  rates  of  rences  In  $ at  1975  prices  and 
increase  in %  1973-81  purchasing  power 
over  parities 
1870-50  1950-60  1960-73  1973-81  1960-73  1960  1973  1981 
Fed.  Rep.  of  1.  5  6.9  5.4  3.7  - 1.7  4.12  8.16  10.89  k;ermany  (0) 
\ 
France  1.9  4.4  5.5  3.3  - 2.2  4.16  8.38  10.89 
Italy  1.4  4.4  6.9  (2.5)  c 
Netherlands  1.4  3.4  5.3  2.4  a  - 2.9  4.63  9.02  10.64b 
~elgium  1.3  3.2  5.4  4.2  c 
United  Kingdom  1.4  2.2  3.9  2.9  - 1.0  4.33  7.10  8.92 
~ S A  2.3  2.3  2.6  1 • 1  - 1.5  7.43  10.42  11.40 
Uapan  1.6  5.7  9.3  3.1  - 6.2  1.65  5.24  6.67 
Average  d  1.7  4.2  5.3  2.8  - 2.5 
Source:  Maddison  (1982,  1982  a)  (a)  1973-80  (c)  1973-79 
(b)  1980  (d)  D,F,NL,UK,USA,J 
The  decline  in  labour  productivity growth  during  1973-81  was  less  pro-
nounced  in  the  countries  which  already  had  a  slower  productivity trend  in 
the 1960s  (the  United  Kingdom  and  the  United  States),  but  also  in the 
Federal  Republic  of  Germany.  It was  sharpest  in  Japan  (see  table 10). 
The  sharper  the decline  in  productivity growth  in  relation to  the  slow-
down  in  economic  growth,  the  less drastic  were  the  necessary  adjustments  in 
employment  trends  (or,  to be  more  precise,  in  the  volume  of  work,  defined 
as  the  product  of  the  numbers  employed  and  average  annual  working  hours  per 
person  employed).  In  other words,  the greater  the  gap  between  the  economic 
growth  rate and  the  growth  rate of  labour  productivity,  the  greater  the 
increase  in  employment  Cor  in  the  volume  of  work).  However,  the tautologi-
cal  links  between  real  growth,  productivity growth  and  changes  in  employ-
ment  make  us  go  round  in circles, unless  we  can  explain: 
why  the  break  in  trend  in  labour  productivity occurred,  and 
why  the  employment  pattern differed so  much  from  country  to  country. -27-
Declining  productivity growth: .an  unsolved  puzzle 
The  slowdown  in productivity  growth  is  sometimes  described  as  the 
major  economic  ill facing  present-day  industrialized societies.  "More  than 
anything else- higher oil prices, deteriorating  terms  of  trade,  greater 
instability  in  capital  and  exchange  markets,  high  inflation- slow  produc-
tivity growth  is the  root  cause  of  the halt  in  the  rise  in  Living  standards 
and  of  the political malaise affecting  the  Western  countries
11  8•  The  rea-
sons  for  this decline  in  productivity growth  have  been  the  subject  of  per-
sistent  controversy. 
Much  has  been  written on  the  slowdown  in productivity growth  in  the 
American  economy  9,  and  the  topic  is as  yet  by  no  means  exhausted  10• 
Recent  research  work  has  not  yet  produced  any  satisfactory solution to  the 
"Great  Productivity Mystery"  •  Most  studies  on  growth  (growth  accounting) 
have  shown  that  Less  than  half  of  the  observed  slowdown  in  the  growth  of 
output  per  unit  of  Labour  input  is attributable to  the  capital  intensity of 
production,  to  the  training and  experience  of  Labour,  to  increasing  regula-
tion and  to  the  aging  of  the  capital  stock. 
For  example,  Nordhaus  <1982),  as  well  as  Denison,  was  bold  enough  to 
attempt  a  simplified assessment  of  the  causes  of  the  slowdown  in  producti-
vity  growth  during  the  period  1973-80  <as  compared  with  1948-65)  in  the 
private sector  in  the  United  States,  identifying the  following  pattern  (in 
percentage points): 
Overall  slowdown 
- cyclical 
- trend 
8  W.O.  Nordhaus  (1982). 
2.5 
0.3 
2.2 
Sources  : 
- capital  stock 
- labour 
- energy 
- regulation 
- R &  D 
- sectoral shifts 
- unexplained 
0.3 
0.1 
0.2 
0.2 
0.1 
0.3 
1.0 
9  E.  Denison  <1979>,  J.  Kendrick  (1981),  B.M.  Fraumani  and  D.W.  Jorgen-
son  (1981>,  M.N.  Baily  <1981)  and  National  Institute of  Economic  and  Social 
Research  (1982). 
10  See  papers  by  Maddison,  Denison,  Jorgenson  and  others  prepared  for  a 
conference  on  International  Comparison  of  Productivity and  Causes  of  the 
Slowdown,  held  on  30  September  1982  under  the  auspices  of  the  American 
Enterprise  Institute for  Public  Policy  Research. -28-
Other  authors  reached  differing  conclusions  as  to the  role and  im-
pact  of  the oil price  rise on  the efficiency of  the  capital  stock  and  on 
productivity growth  (Jorgenson,  Baily)  or  as  regards  the effect  of  slower 
growth  rates  in  investment  and  capital  accumulation  on  labour  productivity. 
Similar difficulties arise  in  attempting  to explain  the  differences 
in productivity  trends  and  in  the  rate of  slowdown  in productivity growth 
in  Europe  since  1973.  Because  the decline  in productivity growth  was  so 
general  and  affected all  the  countries  concerned  simultaneously,  it seems 
reasonable  to  begin  by  looking  for  a  common  explanation.  Factors  that 
spring  to  mind  are: 
the  slowdown  in economic  growth  since  1973,  with  the  two  recession 
periods  of  1974-75  and  1980-81,  resulting  in  lower  capacity utilization,  a 
declining  propensity  to  invest  and  thus  a  slower  growth  in  the  productive 
capital  stock; 
the  rapid  rise  in  energy  prices  which  has  affected all  the  industria-
lized  countries  since 1974; 
the effects of  inflation since  the early 1970s  and  economic  policy 
reactions  thereto. 
The  correlation between  output  and  productivity  has  long  been  known 
as  the Kaldor-Verdoorn  Law.  It  suggests  that,  with  significant  economies  of 
scale,  a  deceleration  in  economic  growth  results  in a  corresponding  slow-
down  in productivity growth,  particularly  in  manufacturing  industry.  These 
medium-term  dynamic  affects are difficult  to measure  for  the  economy  as  a 
whole  and  are obscured  by  many  other  factors  11 
As  a result  of  the  rise  in oil prices,  energy  costs  have  now  risen 
to  some  7  % - 14  % of  GOP  at  factor  cost,  from  1  % - 2  % in 1973.  This  major 
shift  in  relative prices  has  induced  fundamental  changes  in  the  allocation 
of  ressources.  In  particular,  higher-priced energy  has  increasingly  been 
replaced  by  other  production  factors,  and  the  growth  of  demand  and  of  pro-
ductivity  has  been  weakened.  Considerable  controversy  has  arisen as  to  the 
11 
OECD  <1980),  Nordhaus  <1982). -~-
direct  influence of  the  energy  factor  on  the  slowdown  in productivity.  In 
the  case  of  the  United  States,  its  influence  is estimated  to  be  in  the 
12 
region  of  0.1  to 1.5  percentage  points.  Nordhaus  ,  by  contrast,  estimates 
the  effects of  the  rise  in  energy  prices  on  productivity  in  the  OECD  as  a 
whole  during  the  period  1973-79  at  only  0.14  percentage  points  <while  La-
bour  productivity growth  slowed  by  2.4  percentage  points  compared  with 
1963-73). 
Since  1973,  the  increase  in  the  capital  stock  per  employee  <capital 
intensity)  has  fallen off distinctly  in all of  the  countries  considered, 
and,  as  a  result  of  the  two  oil price  shocks,  part  of  the  existing  capital 
stock  has  become  prematurely obsolete  (Table11). Moreover,  owing  to  in-
creasing uncertainty  on  world  financial  and  exchange  markets  and  the  rapid 
rise  in  labour  costs,  the  growth  of  gross  fixed  capital  formation  slackened 
distinctly  in  the  1970s,  which  has  meant  a  slowdown  in  the  introduction of 
new  technologies  <"embodied"  technical  progress). 
The  discussion  about  capital's explanatory  role  in  the  deceleration 
13 
of  productivity growth  has  produced  conflicting  conclusions  •  Yet  the 
slower  rise  in  capital  intensity  (capital-Labour  ratio)  is obviously  a  key 
factor  in  "explaining"  the  slowdown  in productivity growth  in  many  industria-
lized  countries,  for  example  the  Netherlands,  Japan  and  the  United  States 
<see  tables  5  and  10>
14
•  Once  this  is accepted,  the question of  deciding 
whether  the  role of  capital  should  be  measured  by  reference  to gross  or  net 
capital  stocks,  how  the  share  of  capital  in total  factor  inputs  or  the 
coefficients of  elasticity of  output  with  respect  to  capital  services 
should  be  assessed or  how  rapidly  the  capital  stock  has  been  made  obsoles-
cent  through  the oil price  shocks  becomes  less  important.  With  regard  to 
these  matters  the  OECD  analyses  published  so  far  provide,  as  we  have  said, 
conflicting evidence. 
12  Nordhaus  <1980). 
13 See  Norsworthy,  Harper  and  Kunze  <1979),  Baily  (1981),  Kendrick  (1981), 
on  the  one  hand,  and  Denison  (1982),  Nordhaus  <1982),  Maddison  <1982),  on 
the other. 
14 These  are  based  on  Maddison  (1982)  and  contradict  the  results  which 
Nordhaus  <1982)  derives  from  unpublished  OECD  data. -30-
Table  11  :  Growth  of  Capital  Stock  per  Person  Employed  and 
of  Real  Private  Investment 
(Average  annual  growth  rates  in  %) 
Capital-labour-ratio  Real  Gross  Capital  Formation 
(excluding  housing) 
1960-73 
F.R.  Germany  6.2 
France  4.8 
Italy  ( 5 .1) 
United  Kingdom  4.2 
Netherland  5.8 
Japan  10.8 
USA  2.3 
Source  Maddison  <1982  a) 
1973-80 
4.7 
4.7 
(b) 
(2.7) 
3.4 
3.4 
6.9 
0.7 
(c) 
(c) 
; 
i 
/ 
1973-80<a>  1960-73  1973-80 
4.1  4.3  2.4 
(d) 
3.9  6.3  1.5 
(e) 
2.8  5.5  4.7 
2.8  5.5  0.4 
(c)  (f) 
6.3  14.4  2.1 
(c) 
-0.1  5.3  1.0 
(a)  Under  the  assumption  that  5% 
of  the  1973  stock  has  been  ren-
dered  useless  by  the  energy  price 
rise. 
(b)  1973-78 
(c)  1973-79 
d)  1963-73  f)  1965-73 
e)  1962-73 -31-
Another  important  reason  for  the  slowdown  in productivity trends  is 
the  recent  distinct  narrowing  of  the  technological  gap  between  the  United 
States  on  the  one  hand  and  Europe  and  Japan  on  the other.  As  they  move  clo-
ser  to the  American  level  of  productivity,  the  European  industrialized 
countries  find  it more  difficult  to maintain  the  more  rapid productivity 
growth  of  the past,  since  the  risks  and  costs  of  process  and  product  inno-
vation  increase.  Higher  R & D efforts are  required  in  these  conditions  and 
the  growth  of  investment  and  capital  stock  made  more  difficult.  An  interna-
tional  comparison 15  has  shown  that  the  level  of  productivity  in  most  of 
the  European  countries  is approaching  that  in  the  United  States  in  the  eco-
nomy  as  a  whole  but  that  the  gap  is still  large if one  takes  manufacturing 
industry  alone.  In  1960,  the  United  Kingdom  had  achieved  only  60  % and  40 
of  productivity  levels  in  the  United  States, at  the  full  economy  and  in-
dust rial  level,  respectively. 
Many  other  reasons  can  be  advanced  in  attempting  to explain  the 
16 
slowdown  in  productivity growth  but  we  cannot  go  into these  here 
% 
Denison  has  carried out  a  very  detailed analysis  of  the  various  factors  in-
volved  and  concludes,  with  respect  to  the  United  States,  that  a  "residual" 
comprising all  the  changes  that  cannot  be  directly measured  -and in parti-
cular the  slowdown  in  advances  in  knowledge  - accounts  for  around  70  % of 
the  total decline  in  labour  productivity and  remains  a  mystery.  The  only 
17 
possible  explanation  is  perhaps  "that everything  had  gone  wrong  at  once" 
However,  the  general  slowdown  in  productivity growth  is  more  and 
more  frequently  being  attributed to  changes  in general  socio-political  con-
ditions,  changes  which  may  have  reached  "critical mass"  proportions.  Per-
sistent  inflation is often  identified as  a  major  factor  in this  economic 
environment.  Inflation may,  through  a  deterioration  in  the allocation of 
resources  and  in  economic  policy  reactions,  have  damaged  the  propensity  to 
invest  and  the  innovative drive  and  hence  productivity growth.  Changes  in 
social,  institutional and  tax-related environment  and  the  increasing  size 
of  the  public  sector,  so  it is argued,  have  in  the  longer  term  reduced  the 
efficiency of  the  private-sector production  and  growth  process  in  favour  of 
15 
Roy  (1982). 
16 See,for  the  European  countries,  Boyer  and  Petit  (1980,  1981),  Wegner 
<1980),  Maddison  (1982). 
17 According  to  Denison  <1979,  1982),  this  residual  increased  by  1,4 % 
annually  in  1948-73  and  decreased  by  0,25%  in 1973-81. -32-
other priorities  (more  equity,  increased social protection).  However,  there 
is  no  direct  evidence  for  such  a  hypothesis  and  it is contradicted by  the 
uniformity  of  the  slowdown  in  productivity growth  in  the  United  States  and 
Japan,  which  have  very  different  traditions  and  behaviourial  patterns 18 • 
From  Denison's  failure  to explain  the  residual  in  the  slowdown  in 
productivity  growth  since  1973,  Olson 19  drew  the  radical  conclusion  that 
the  deceleration  in productivity  and  the  simultaneous  emergence  of  stag-
flation  have  a  common  cause,  namely  the  rigidities  introduced  into the  eco-
nomy  by  collective interest groups.  The  widespread  network  of  cartelistic 
and  lobbying  organizations  and  informal  collusions  developed  gradually 
during  the  long  periods  of  stability and  high  growth;  they  are  mainly  en-
gaged  in distributional  coalitions  seeking  redistributions  towards  their 
own  clients.  After  a  while,  this  network  reduces  society's  capacity  to 
adopt  new  technologies  and  establish barriers  to entry that  reduce  the  ca-
pacity to  reallocate  resources  quickly  in  response  to  changing  conditions 
and  ultimately  undermine  the  growth  rate.  Olson  uses-these  collective be-
haviour  patterns  to explain  the  risP.  of  Japan  and  Germany  after the  Second 
World  War,  the  slow  economic  growth  of  Great  Britain,  the  emergence  of 
massive  involuntary  unemployment  and  the  inability to  cope  with  the  supply 
shocks  which  occurred  in  the early 1970s. 
Manufacturing  industry  and  export  dependence 
A number  of differences  in overall  employment  and  productivity 
trends  as  between  the  United  States  and  the  European  industrialized coun-
tries  can  also  be  traced  back  to differing trends  in  manufacturing  industry. 
The  main  differences  are  (see  Table  12). 
the  proportion  of  total  employment  accounted  for  by  manufacturing 
industry  is higher  in  Europe  than  in  the  United  States,  i.e.  some  28%  of 
employment  (1980)  in  the  European  Community  and  some  20  % in  the  United 
States; 
18  See  also Ostry  and  Koromzay  (1982). 
19 Olson  (1982). I
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the  slowdown  in  the  growth  of  manufacturing  output  has  been  sharper 
in  Europe  than  in  Japan  or  the  United  States  since  1973,  as  compared  with 
1960-73;  however,  the  decline  in  manufacturing  was  as  a  rule  more  marked 
everywhere  than  the  general  slowdown  in  growth; 
in  most  of  the  Community  countries  (and  also  in  Japan),  the statisti-
cally  recorded  growth  rate of  productivity per man-hour  has  declined  much 
less  sharply,  as  compared  with  the  1960s,  than  in  the  United  States,  where 
it has  fallen  by  an  average  of  almost  two  thirds;  as  a  result,  productivity 
per  man-hour  in  the  period 1973-81  increased  in  the  European  Community  more 
than  twice  as  fast  as  in  the  United  States; 
in  the  Community  countries,  the  numbers  employed  in  manufacturing 
industry declined  significantly  from  1973  to  1981  <except  in  Italy),  while 
in  the  United  States  they  increased slightly. 
There  are a  number  of  signs  to  suggest  that  the declining and  threat-
ened  competitiveness  of  European  industry  in  the  1970s  was  defended  largely 
by  a  marked  shedding  of  labour  which  can  explain partly the  continuing  high 
level  of  productivity.  At  the  same  time,  considerable  use  was  made  of  cuts 
20 
in  working  hours  in  Europe,  once  again  in  contrast  with  the  United  States 
The  need  for  self-defence  in  the  form  of  continued  high,  albeit 
somewhat  slower,  productivity growth  in  manufacturing  industry  is closely 
related to  the  considerably  higher  export  dependence  of  the  European  in-
dustrialized countries  compared  with  the  United  States  and  also  Japan.  The 
share  of  exports  (goods  and  services)  has  risen  in all the  European  coun-
tries except  the  Netherlands,  picking  up  speed  since 1973;  in  the  United 
States,  the  increase  in  the  share  of  exports  has  been  distinctly  slower 
<see  Table  12). 
20  Information on  trends  in  manufacturing  industry  is based  on  publi-
cations  of  the  US  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics. -35-
IV  REAL  WAGES,  ADJUSTMENT  PROBLEMS  AND  EMPLOYMENT 
The  economies  of  the  European  Community  are  much  more  strongly  in-
tegrated within  the  international  competitive  system  than  the  United  States 
and  Japan.  Because  of  the  need  to maintain  competitiveness  and  because  of 
the  impact  of  restrictive anti-inflationary policies,  the apparent  produc-
tivity growth  per  man-hour  in manufacturing  has  therefore declined only 
slightly  in  Europe  as  compared  with  the  United  States and  Japan.  There  are 
doubts  if and  how  far  the  continuing  high  Level  of  productivity growth  in 
the  exposed  sectors  in  Europe  since  1973  has  been  achieved  by  means  of  more 
rapid  technical  progress  and  an  accelerated  increase  in  the  capital-Labour 
ratio.  In  any  case,  the  Large-scale  shedding  of  Labour  was  important.  The 
numbers  employed  in manufacturing  industry  in  the  Community  have  declined 
by  1,7 % annually  since  1973,  and  the  number  of  weekly  working  hours  per 
person  employed  has  fallen  by  almost  1  % annually.  What  are  the  factors  be-
hind  this dramatic  Labour  shedding  process  since 1973? 
Real  wages  and  employment 
The  argument  frequently  put  forward  in  the  academic  and  political 
debate  is that  the  Lack  of  employment  opportunities  and  the  sharp  and  per-
sistent  rise  in  unemployment  are essentially the  result  of  real  wages  being 
too  high,  making  it unprofitable  for  firms  to  absorb all of  the  Labour 
force  potential.  The  explanation of  this "classical" unemployment  (as  op-
posed  to cyclical,  "Keynesian"  unemployment  caused  by  a  deficiency of  ag-
gregate effective demand)  starts from  the  tenet  of  neo-classical  theory, 
based  on  a  partial analysis,  that  Labour  demand  is a  declining  function  of 
real  Labour  costs.  If  the  real  wage  rate  rises  above  the  point  of  equili-
brium  <where  the  supply  and  demand  curves  meet),  demand  for  Labour  will  be 
reduced.  In  the  Longer  term,  because  of  the  change  in  factor  price  rela-
tionships,  capital  is  increasingly substituted for  labour.  At  the  same  time, 
sharp  increases  in  real  wages  in  excess  of  productivity growth  depress  the 
profitability and  earnings  of  firms,  thus  reducing  incentives  to  invest  in 
the  extension of  production  capacities. 
Factual  evidence  shows  how  varied  the  wage  adjustment  process  has 
been  in  the  industrialized countries.  This  adjustment  process  has  taken  on 
a  completely  new  significance as  a  result  of  the  supply  shocks  and  the -36-
slowdown  in productivity growth  on  the  one  hand  and  the  new  regime  of 
floating  exchange  rates  and  the  changes  in  economic  policy  on  the other. 
Since  1973,  particularly  in  the  United  States and  most  of  the  European 
countries,  differences  in  the  degree  of  flexibility of  real  wages  have 
emerged,  and  these  have  been  coupled  with  differences  in employment  trends  •. 
It  is generally  agreed  that,  in  the  United  States,  the  adjustment  of  nomi-
nal  wages  was  sluggish,  as  a  result  of  three-year  wage  agreements,  and  that 
consequently  real  wages 21  rose  only  a  little or  actually fell  because  of 
the  faster  rise  in  inflation.  In  Europe,  by  contrast,  nominal  wages  acce-
lerated with  inflation,  and  real  wages  therefore  continued  to  rise despite 
the  supply  shocks  and  the decline  in  productivity  growth.  The  factors  be-
hind  this  were  the  spread  of  labour-market  regulation  and  of  indexation 
mechanisms,  underestimation  of  the  repercussions  and  uncertainties  caused 
by  the oil  shock  and  the  sharp  fluctuations  in  exchange  rates,  and  the dif-
fering  role  of  the  unions  and  of  incomes  policies  in  the  wage  formation 
process.  Although  real  wages  adjusted better to  the  changes  in  the  general 
environment  after the  second oil price  shock  in  1979-81  (e.g.  in Germany, 
the  Netherlands  and  the  United  Kingdom),  they often  continued  to  rise faster 
than  labour  productivity. 
It  has  become  standard practice to take  as  the  yardstick  for  wage 
adjustment  the  gap  between  the  rise  in  the  real  product  wage  and  the 
growth  of  labour  productivity.  This  "real  labour  cost  gap"  (real  wage 
gap)  has  recently often been  seen  as  a  measure  of  the disequilibrium  in 
the  labour  market.  The  real  labour  cost  gap  shows  the deviation of  the 
rise  1n  real  wages  from  the  rate that  would  have  left  the  wage  share 
u~changed with  reference  to a  base period.  In  tables  13  and  14,  the  real 
l~bour cost  gap  (taking  1972  as  the base  year)  is  compared  with  the trend 
of  employment. 
The  United  States did  not,  either  in  the  1960s  or  in  the  1970s, 
have  any  sustained  real  per  capita  wage  increases  that  were  significantly 
in  excess  of  the  low  rate of  productivity growth  adjusted  for  changes  in 
the  terms  of  trade.  Real  wages  followed  the  pronounced  cyclical  fluctuations 
21  Or,  to be  more  precise,  real  compensation  from  paid  employment. -37-
Table  13  Employment,  Labour  Productivity and  Real  Wages  1960-1983 
(Average  annual changesin%- Whole  economy) 
USA  Japan  EEC-10 
Employment  1960-73  2.0  1.2  0.2 
1973-81  1.9  0.9  -0.1 
1973-75  -0.1  -0.3  -0.4 
1975-79  3.5  1.4  0.4 
1979-81  0.8  0.9  -0.8 
1981-83  -0.3  1.3  -1.3 
(a) 
Labour  productivity  1960-73  2.0  9.1  4.4 
(per  person  employed)  1973-81  0.2  2.7  2.0 
1973-75  -0.7  0.9  0.7 
1975-79  0.8  3.7  3.1 
1979-81  0.1  2.7  1.2 
1981-83  0.3  1.8  1.7 
(b) 
Real  product  wage  1960-73  2.0  8.2  4.4 
(per  wage  and  salary earner)  1973-81  0.3  4.2  2.4 
1973-75  -0.8  6.1  3.6 
1975-79  1 .1  3.4  2.0 
1979-81  -o. 1  3.6  2.1 
1981-83  0.2  3.1  0.4 
Real  wage  gap 
(C) 
1975  99.8  112.7  106.8 
(Indices  1972  = 100)  1979  100.8  111.3  102.6 
1981  100.6  113.1  104.4 
1983  100.7  116.2  101.8 
Sources:  Services  of  the  Commission;  Eurostat;  1982  and  1983,  estimates 
(a)Real  GOP  (prices  1975)  per  person  employed 
(b)Compensation  of employees  deflated  by  the  implicit  price deflator of  GOP 
(c)Real  wage  gap  :  Compensation  per  wage  and  salary earner deflated by  GOP-
deflator, minus  Labour  productivity. -38-
in  productivity,  but  were  flat  taking  the  period  1973-81  as  a  whole.  Neither 
in  the  1960s  nor  since  1973  has  any  real  wage  gap  developed.  The  numbers  in 
employment  rose  sharply,  by  a  cumulative  total  of  18%  from  1973  to  1981. 
In  Japan,  real  wage  growth  in  the  1960s  was  over  a  long  period  be-
low  the  high  rate of  productivity growth,  producing  a  rapid  improvement  in 
the  profit  ratio  up  to 1969.  It was  not  until  the first oil price  shock  that 
Labour  costs  began  to accelerate,  especially  in  manufacturing  industry,where 
the  fall-off  in  productivity growth  was  very  pronounced.  Since  then,  a  wide 
gap  has  opened  up  between  the  rise  in  real  wages  and  productivity growth, 
though  this  was  corrected to  some  extent  after 1976,  particularly after the 
second  oil  price  shock.  However,  the  low  level  of  the  wage  share  obtaining 
in  the early 1970s  was  not  restored.  Despite  this  relatively wide  real  La-
bour  cost  gap,  employment  problems  have  not  emerged  in  Japan.  The  pronounced 
flexibility of  wages  and  the  unusually  fast  growth  of  productivity  in  cer-
tain sectors  have,  admittedly,  benefited exports  and  the  employment  situa-
tion  in  the  service  industries.  The  wage  share  in  manufacturing  remained 
significantly  lower  than  in  the  United  States and  the  Community;  total 
hourly  Labour  costs  expressed  in dollars  are still well  below  the  labour 
costs  of  Japan's  main  competitors,  the  United  States  and  Europe  22 • 
After  a  fairly  long  period  of  stable wage  shares  in  the  1960s  and 
a  rise beginning  at  the  end  of  the  1960s,  real  wages  in  most  of  the  European 
countries  increased further  in  the  period  1972-75,  outstripping productivity 
growth.  The  real  labour  cost  gap  which  developed  during  that  period general-
ly  narrowed  after 1975,  but  widened  again after the  second  oil price  shock, 
as  productivity  increases  slowed  down  further  and  the  terms  of  trade dete-
riorated once  again.  Only  a  few  Community  countries  (United  Kingdom,  Fede-
ral  Republic  of  Germany,  Netherlands  and  Denmark)  managed  to secure  an  ad-
justment  of  real  wage  trends  to  the  changed  circumstances.  In  a  number  of 
countries  the  adjustment  was  still hesitant  by  1981  or  had  not  occurred at 
all  (Italy,  Belgium,  Ireland  and  France). 
22  Economic  Policy  Committee,"Real  Labour  Costs,  Profitability and 
Employment",Report  to  the  Council,  Brussels,  25  Oct.  1982  (Doc.II/435/82 fin.). T
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 -~- I 
A Large  number  of  econometric  analyses  carried out  over  the  Last 
forty  years  have  attempted  to establish  and  quantify  the  Link  between  real 
wages  and  Labour  demand.  Most  of  these  are  confined  to  national  economies 
and  are  based  either on  individual  Labour  demand  equations  or  on  overall 
models.  More  recently,  several  comparative  analyses  covering  the  OECD  coun-
tries  have  been  published  2 ~ Some  found  that  there  was  no  Link  whatsoever24 • 
The  conclusions  reached  in  most  of  the  studies are  not  conclusive,  and  the 
only  point  on  which  there  is  in  fact  agreement  is  that,  as  a  result  of  the 
supply  shock  after 1973,  a  real  wage  problem  developed  and  that  this  con-
tributed to  the deterioration of  the  employment  situation.  Estimates  of  the 
contributory  role  of  the  real  wage  factor  vary  widely.  Some  estimates  of 
real  wage  elasticity with  respect  to demand  for  employment  indicate  values 
of  between  -0.1  and  -2;  however,  most  of  the  results  are  in  the  range  be-
tween  -0.3 and  -0.5,  suggesting  that  employment  would  in  the  Longer  term 
increase  by  0,5  %,  if  (other  things  being  equal)  real  wages  fell  by  1  %. 
With  such  relatively  Low  elasticities,  a  reduction  in  real  wages  of  some 
10  % would  be  necessary  in order  to  increase  employment  by  5  % <which  would 
not  necessarily  result  in  an  equivalent  fall  in  unemployment). 
Real  wages,  inflation and  adjustment  problems 
The  comparative  analyses  carried out  by  the  OECD  Secretariat  and 
by  the  services  of  the  Commission  of  the  European  Communities  throw  up  no 
clear  empirical  conclusion  on  the  Link  between  real  wage  costs  and  employ-
ment,  certainly  not  for  the  period after 1973.  It  was  not  possible  to 
demonstrate  with  any  certainty,  and  as  a  generally  valid  finding,  the  ex-
tent  to  which  the  real  Labour  cost  problem  is  the  main  cause  of  unemploy-
ment.  The  various  definitions  of  the  "real  labour  cost  gap"  result  in quite 
Large  empirical  differences  in  the  identification and  ranking  of  the  "pro-
blem  countries" 
2 ~ as  the  findings  of  the  OECD,  the  Commission  of  the 
European  Communities  and  the  German  Council  of  Economic  Advisers  show.  The 
major  handicap  in  using  the  Link  between  the  real  Labour  cost  gap  and 
23  OECD  <1982);  Grubb,  Layard,  Symons  (1982  a),  Sachs  (1979),  Branson 
and  Rotemberg  <1980),  Bruno  and  Sachs  (1981). 
24  Geary  and  Kennan  (1982). 
25  Earlier  OECD  analyses  revealed  no  real  Labour  cost  gap  in  Italy, 
while  in  Economic  Outlook  no.  32  of  December  1982,  itis Less  than  that 
in  France  <see  Table  14). -41-
employment  lies elsewhere,  namely  in  the  fact  that  it is not  a  sufficient 
indicator to explain the  trend of  employment.  The  real  per  capita  product 
wage  and  the  apparent  average  productivity  do  not  follow  trends  that  are 
independent  of  each  other.  In  very  open  national  economies,  a  rapid  rise 
in  real  wages  often forces  companies  to  cut  their workforces  rapidly,  since 
those  exposed  to  competition  have  to shut  down  unprofitable  capacity or  to 
close  down  m~rginal establishments,  as  can  be  seen  from  the  example  of  the 
Unjted  Kingdom  or  the  Netherlands. The  resultant  rise  in  labour  productivi-
ty  may  leave  the  real  labour  cost  gap  unchanged,  even  though  the  high  real 
wage  level  has  created  a  massive  deterioration  in  employment,  particularly 
in  manufacturing. 
Interpreting the  real  wage  gap  as  an  indicator of  the  "pricing out 
of  work"  phenomenon  raises  a  similar problem  when  a  comparison  is  made  be-
tween  the  United  States  and  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany.  The  United 
States  and  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  have  broadly  similar positive 
trends  in  the  real  labour  cost  gap.  However,  with  similar  real  growth  rates 
for  1973-80  <2,4  % a  year>,  the  trends  of  employment  were  entirely different, 
rising  in  the  United  States  and  declining  (particularly  in  manufacturing) 
in  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany.  These  differences  are  probably  partly 
attributable to  the persistent  undervaluation  of  the  OM  in  the  1960s,  which 
resulted  in an  expansion  of  the  export-dependent,  industrial  sector 26 ; 
then,  in  the  1970s,  the positive effects of  wage  adjustment  were  oversha-
dowed  by  the  appreciation of  the  OM. 
Lastly,  the  influence of  real  wages  on  employment  also depends  on 
the  inflation  rate and  on  the  intensity of  the anti-inflationary policy 
pursued.  The  real  wage  problems  which  have  arisen  in  Europe  since  1973  are 
largely the  result of  inadequate  adjustment  to unforeseen  increases  in  raw 
material  prices  (i.e. deteriorations  in  the  terms  of  trade amounting  to  some 
10%  in each  of  the  two  periods  1973-74  and  1979-80)  and,  an  even  more  deci-
sive factor,  to the  sharp  slackening  in  productivity growth  amounting  to 
some  2- 2  1/2% annually  <see  Table10), equivalent  to a  real  wage  loss  of 
some  16- 20%  over  that  eight-year period alone.  Thus,  because  we  realized 
too  late that  the  period of  growth  had  come  to  an  end,  we  have  "drifted" 
26  I  .  f..  l  '  nst1tut  ur  We  tw1rtschaft  (1980),  Strukturbericht;  a  contrary 
view  is taken  by  Kalmbach  (1980). -~-
into a  situation of  very  high  real  wage  levels.  In  this situation,  economic 
policy  makers  had  two  choices:  either "confirming"  the  rise  in  real  wages 
and  keeping  the  degree  of  capacity utilization and  the activity  rate  as 
high  as  possible,  which  meant  inflation, or  attempting  to  halt  the  rise  in 
the  inflation  rate and,  as  a  price  for  this,  accepting  short-term  losses  in 
growth  and  rising  unemployment27  •  The  United  States and  Italy provide 
examples  of  the first  choice,  with  Italy,  as  an  export-dependent  country, 
accepting  continual  currency  depreciations.  T~ Federal  Republic  of  Germany 
and  the  Netherlands  opted  for  the painful  strategy of  stability.  The  scope 
for  passing  on  higher  costs  <wages,  non-wage  labour  costs,  raw  material 
prices)  was  most  restricted  in  those  countries  which  pursued  a 
11tight"  ex-
change  rate policy  as  part  of  their counterinflationary policy  and  which 
were  exposed  to  international  competition  in  respect  of  a  large  proportion 
of  their production.  In  these  countries,  any  rigidity  in  wage  behaviour  re-
duced  the profitability of  firms,  which  reacted  by  cutting output  and  em-
ployment. 
The  increase  in  the  real  product  wage  has  slackened significantly 
in  almost  all  the  countries  since  1979  and  has  in  some  cases  actually be-
come  negative  (Table 14).  Despite this,  the  employment  situation  <except 
in  Japan)  has  generally deteriorated.  It  may  be  concluded  from  this that 
demand  for  labour  is  influenced  by  a  wide  variety  of  factors  and  not  just 
by  real  wages.  It can  even  be  argued  that,  since  the  beginning  of  the  1980s, 
worldwide  demand  deficieny  has  probably  been  the  main  factor  behind  the 
rapid  increase  in  unemployment. 
The  argument  over  whether  aggregate  demand  and  wage  increases  im-
prove  the  employment  situation or  whether  an  improvement  requires  cuts  in 
real  wages  is an  old one.  The  debate  is  not  just  between  Keynesians  or 
trade unionists,  who  often  see  only  the  purchasing  power  role  and  demand-
generating aspect  of  wage  incomes,  and  neo-classicists  and  employers,  who 
stress only  the  cost  aspect,  the  role  of  profits  and  relative price  changes. 
It  is also  about  whether  to  rely  on  essentially cyclical/short-term expla-
nations  of  the  employment  crisis or  to  focus  more  on  the  range  of  long-
term/structural  causes.  the  interrelationship between  wage  costs,  inflation, 
27  See  Grubb  et al.  (1982). -43-
employment  and  economic  growth  is  much  more  complex  than this,  so  that  the 
"Keynesian  versus  classical  unemployment"  line of  reasoning  does  not  pro-
vide  an  adequate  explanation.  A synthesis  has  emerged  recently  in  the  form 
.  .  . l . b  .  h  28  h .  h  l  of  the  modern  macroeconom1c  d1sequ1  1  r1um  t  eory  •  T 1s  t  eory  postu  ates 
that  unemployment  has  at  present  both  Keynesian  and  classical  causes  and 
that  it can  therefore be  overcome  only  through  a  two-pronged  economic  policy 
aimed  at  expanding  overall  demand  and  increasing production  capacities  by 
means  of  moderation  in  real  wages. 
Just  as  difficult as  the  analysis  of  causes  and  correct  diagnosis 
of  the  problem  is  the question of  how  real  wage  cuts  are arrived at  and 
ultimately  lead  to higher  business  profits and  possibly  to  increased  invest-
ment.  The  framework  and  forms  of  wage  formation,  trade  union  pressures, 
energy  prices,  non-wage  costs  and  the  scope  for  passing  them  on,  the  rise 
in  labour  productivity and  output  prices,  the effects of  exchange  rate 
changes  and  of  the  level  of  competition,  and  the  level  of  dependence  on 
foreign  trade are all  factors  at  work  here  and  influence  one  another.  Since 
the effects of  wage  rate  changes  on  employment  in  open  economies  have  be-
come  so  uncertain  and  since  the  structural shifts brought  about  by  exces-
sively  high  real  wages  become  almost  irreversible,  it might  be  concluded 
that  there  is  little or  no  hope  of  influencing  the  employment  situation 
29 
through  an  aggressive  policy of  wage  reductions  alone  •  At  all events,  the 
universal  recipe of  real  wage  cuts  cannot  be  applied  by  all the  industria-
lized  countries  simultaneously,  since  this  would  initiate futile  beggar-
my-neighbour  policies and  would  ultimately  produce  deflation. 
Real  wages  and  the  relative  wage  structure 
Changes  in  real  wages  are misleading  as  an  indicator of  the flexi-
bility of  wage  adjustments  to  the  extent  that  they  provide  only  average 
values  for  an  economy.  It seems  to  be  more  important  for  any  explanation of 
the  employment  trend  to  include  sectoral  and  regional  differences  and  dif-
ferences  in vocational  skills, i.e.  the  relative wage  structure.  On  a  very 
28  Malinvaud  <1977,  1980),  Maddison  and  Wilstra  (1982>,  Sachs  <1983), 
Dornbusch  et al.  <1983). 
29  Bambach  <1978>. -«-
general  level,  wage  differentiation  in  the  United  States  has  remained  high 
and  has  presumably  increased further  in  Japan  since  the first oil price 
shock.  In  most  of  the  European  countries,  the  tendency  to  squeeze  wage  dif-
ferentials  strengthened  in  the  1970s,  even  though  the differences  in  pro-
ductivity growth  between  sectors  and  within  sectors  probably  tended  to 
widen.  The  empirical  facts  below  tend  to  bear  this out,  although  they  are 
neither fully  comparable  nor  complete. 
The  United  States,  like  Japan,  benefited  from  the  dual  nature  of 
its  labour  market.  In  the  United  States,  the  decline  in  real  wages  after the 
first oil price  shock  was  essentially the  result  of  moderation  in  the  non-
unionized  sector,  where  the  employment  reaction  was  stronger  than  in  the 
high-wage,  organized sector.  However,  at  the  end  of  the  1970s  it became 
clear that  the  above-average  wage  settlements  in  a  number  of  industries with 
a  high  degree  of  unionization  resulted  in  employment  difficulties where  the 
industries were  exposed  to  increased  international  competition  (steel,  motor 
vehicles).  Similarly,  relative per  capita  wages  in  most  of  the  service sec-
30 
tors  were  significantly  lower  than  the  average  for  industry  and  thus al-
lowed  flexible  adjustment  and  an  expansion  of  employment. 
.  31  f  .  .  .  .  A comparat1ve  survey  o  wage  structures  1n  s1x  Commun1ty  countr1es 
provides  material  for  a  number  of  general  conclusions,  though  these  need  to 
be  modified  and  supplemented  in  various  respects: 
in  industry and  in a  small  number  of  service sectors  (for which 
comparable  information  is available),  the  United  Kingdom,  France  and  Italy 
show  relatively  large  inequalities  in  per  capita  wages,  while  the  Federal 
Republic  of  Germany  shows  the gratest degree  of  uniformity  among  the  six 
countries,  with  Belgium  and  the  Netherlands  occupying  an  intermediate posi-
tion; 
30  The  lowest  per  capita wages  are  in  the  hotel  trade,  personal  services, 
amusement  and  recreation,  educational  services  and  the "social  services" 
sector. 
31 
~  Saunders,  Marsden  <1981). -45-
in  the  case  of  total  labour  costs,  i.e.  including  non-wage  costs, 
Germany  o~ce again  and  also  the  Netherlands  show  the  smallest  differences 
between  the  various  branches,  while  the  United  Kingdom  and  Italy show  the 
largest differences; 
wage  differentials narrowed  somewhat  in  the  United  Kingdom  during 
the  1970s,  and  even  more  so  in  France;  all  in all,  however,  seen  the  wide 
differences  in  inflation  rates  and  in  trade  union  policy,  wage  structures 
in  the  United  Kingdom  and  in  Germany  changed  remarkedly  little; among  the 
few  groups  to  imrove  their positions  were  coalmining  (in  France  and  Germany) 
and  women  <in  the  United  Kingdom  and  the  Netherlands); 
among  the  various  determinants  of  relative  wage  inequalities, dif-
ferences  relating  to trade or  profession were  the  dominant  factors.  The 
United  Kingdom  is  something  of  an  exception,  with  the  very  wide  overall 
spread  of  wages  owing  relatively  little to differences  between  trades  or 
professions:  major  inequalities  in  wages,  particularly of  manual  workers, 
are  to be  found  within  one  and  the  same  branch  of  industry  and  vocational 
group  (possibly  due  in  some  cases  to  the  extensive  use  of  overtime). 
If  we  leave  aside  the particular  case of  the  United  Kingdom,  where 
general  economic  growth  in  the  1970s  was  especially  low,  there are  strong 
grounds  for  suspecting  that  the  levelling of  the  intersectoral  wage  struc-
ture  has  hindered  the  growth  of  employment  and  has  increased pressures  to-
wards  labour-saving  in  the structurally weak  industries  (and  regions). -~-
V  SUMMARY 
In  the  1970s,  unemployment  became  the  most  serious  economic  problem 
confronting  the  Western  world.  There  are at  present  33  million  unemployed 
persons  in  the  Western  industrialized countries.  Unemployment  has  thus  in-
creased  fourfold,  and  in  some  countries  tenfold,  compared  with  the  1960s. 
There  are  many  reasons  why  this dramatic  deterioration  has  occurred.  One  of 
them  is the  acceleration  in  the  growth  of  the  Labour  supply  as  a  result  of 
demographic  trends  and  the  steady  increase  in  female  participation  rates. 
The  potential  Labour  force  in  Europe  will  continue  to expand  into 
the  second  half  of  the  1980s  and  will  not  begin  to decline significantly 
until  after 1990.  The  European  economies  are  therefore  faced  with  the  major 
challenge  of  creating millions  of  new  jobs,  both  for  the  many  young  people 
seeking  employment  for  the first  time  and  for  the  unemployed  who  have  Lost 
the  jobs  they  once  had. 
If  the  present  Level  of  unemployment  is  to  be  halved  by  1990,  and 
assuming  that  the  existing activity-rate trends  continue,  some  10  to  11 
million  jobs  will  have  to  be  created  in  the  European  Community  from  1984  to 
1990.  This  target  implies  an  annual  increase of  some  1,5  % in  numbers  em-
ployed.  Can  the  Community  seriously  expect  to accomplish  such  a  task  in 
seven  years?  The  United  States  created  some  14  million  jobs  in  the  seven 
years  from  1974  to 1980,  while  during  the  same  period  employment  in  the 
European  Community,  with  a  Labour  force  of  comparable  size,  increased  by 
slightly  Less  than  1  1/2 million.  In  comparing  experience  in  the  United 
States and  in  the  Community,  can  we  Learn  any  Lessons  as  to  how  we  in 
Europe  can  deal  with  the  employment  problems  of  the  1980s?  Three  strategies 
which  might  generate additional  demand  for  Labour  will  be  examined  briefly 
below  32 
boosting  economic  growth; 
forgoing  productivity  growth; 
moderating  or  reducing  real  wages. 
32  We  Leave  aside  here  the  question of  reductions  in  working  Lifetimes 
and  in  the  annual  duration of  work,  which  have  recently often  been  put  at 
the  top of  the  List;  see  inter alia  Wegner  <1980). -47-
Increased  employment  through  faster  economic  growth? 
Restoring  the  growth  rates  of  real  gross  domestic  product  witnessed 
in  the  1960s  is often  seen  as  an  essential  condition  for  overcoming  current 
unemployment.  However,  most  of  the  medium-term  projections  for  the  Communi-
ty anticipate a  slow  recovery  from  the  long  period  of  stagnation,  with 
growth  rates  averaging  some  2-3  % annually.  Given  the  expected  increase  in 
the  potential  labour  force  in  the  Community,  permanent  real  growth  of  5  % 
a  year,  if not  more,  would  probably  be  needed  to bring  unemployment  down  to 
a  tolerable  level.  The  radical  changes  in our  economic  environment  and 
attitudes,  the  instability and  uncertainty of  world  economic  conditions 
and  general  scepticism as  to  the  effectiveness of  governments'  expansionary 
policies  in  face  of  their  high  level  of  indebtedness  make  it improbable 
that  the  European  industrialized countries  can  return quickly,  if  they  can 
return at all, to  the  growth  path  of  the  1960s.  It  is also an  open  question 
whether  such  a  growth  rate  is  in  fact  desirable  if it entails a  rapid dete-
rioration  in  the  natural  environment  and  greater dependence  on  energy  im-
ports.  An  even  more  serious  matter  is that, despite  the  intensive  research 
into growth  during  the  past  twenty  years,  we  are  not  much  wiser  on  the 
question  of  whether  and  how  sustained  growth  can  in  fact  be  "produced". 
But  was  slower  economic  growth  really  the  main  cause  of  the  employ-
ment  problems  of  the  1970s'?  In  the  1960s,  the  numbers  employed  in  the 
Community  showed  little or  no  increase despite  vigorous  economic  growth. 
Since  the  first oil price crisis, the  average  growth  rate of  real  GOP  in 
the  Community  has  fallen drastically, i.e.  by  half,  whereas  the  numbers 
employed  in  the  period  1973-80  continued  to  increase,  albeit  only  slightly. 
A marked  decline  in  the  numbers  employed  did  not  set  in until  economic 
activit~ began  to  stagnate  in  mid-1980.  Since  then,  employment  has  been 
falling  in  most  of  the  European  countries:  in  the  Community,  more  than 
4  million  jobs  disappeared  from  1980  to 1983. 
It is  instructive to  compare  experience  in  the  United  States  and 
in  Europe  since  1973.  The  differences  in  employment  trends  show  that  even 
relatively  low  economic  growth  such  as  that  in  the  United  States,  which 
was  only  slightly higher  than  in  Europe,  does  not  necessarily  slow  down  the 
rate  of  job  creation.  The  explanation  for  the  American  "employment  miracle" 
can  be  found  in  the  service  sector.  The  total  of  more  than  15  million  new -48-
jobs  created  in  the  United  States  between  1973  to  1981  arose  almost  exclu-
sively  in  private service  industries  <12  million)  and  in  the  government 
sector  <2  million).  In  the  Community,  by  contrast,  service employment 
growth  <1,5  % annually  in  the  1973-1981  period)  was  only  a  little over  half 
~~at  in  the  United  States,  while  there  was  a  marked  drop  in  the  numbers 
employed  in agriculture  (a  fall  of  2  million)  and  in  industry  (a  fall  of 
4,7 million).  What  has  happened  in  the  United  States  shows  how  much  future 
employment  potential  there  is  in  Europe  also,  if  we  succeed  in  securing  a 
flexible  and  increasingly private-enterprise supply  of  jobs  in services, 
which  are  among  the  most  highly  regulated  branches  of  economic  activity.  A 
large  proportion  of  social,  leisure,  health  and  educational  services  will 
remain  labour-intensive  in  the  future.  Lastly,  tomorrow's  "information 
society"  could  provide  further  impetus  to  the  development  of  service  jobs 
and  activities and  to  the  rapid  expansion  of  a  "quarternary" sector.  The 
scope  for  increased employment  in  the  service sector must,  however,  be  left 
for  fuller  examination  elsewhere. 
A consistently  high  level  of  economic  growth  may  be  desirable,  but 
it must  remain  very  doubtful  whether  more  rapid  growth  is  the  "royal  road" 
to  restoring full  employment  in  the  1980s. 
Forgoing  productivity  growth? 
Economic  growth  in  the  United  States  since  1973  has  been  accom-
plished  almost  exclusively  through  the  increase  in  employment.  The  sta-
tistically  recorded  labour  productivity of  the  economy  has  therefore  in-
creased only  slightly.  There  has  been  much  controversy over  why  there  has 
been  virtually no  growth  in  labour  productivity,  and  American  economists 
have  come  to  refer  to  the  phenomenon  as  the  "great  productivity mystery". 
In  the  European  indL·strialized  countries,  the  relatively  high  rate of  pro-
ductivity growth  obtaining  in  the  1960s  has  been  halved  since 1973,  although 
productivity growth  per  man-hour  in  manufacturing,  which  is still a  key 
sector,  has  generally declined  less  sharply.  It would  seem  that,  in  the 
struggle  for  their share  of  world  markets,  which  are growing  more  slowly, 
the  European  industrialized  countries  have  reacted  by  rapidly  reducing  em-
ployment  so  as  to  improve  their competitiveness  through  higher  productivity 
growth.  After  1973,  Europe,  which  is  much  more  dependent  on  external  trade 
than  the  United  States  and  consequently also  more  vulnerable,  achieved  a 
further distinct  increase  in its share  of  exports. -~-
The  Levelling-off  of  overall  productivity growth  in  the  1970s  was 
the  result  of  a  combination  of  cyclical,  non-recurring  and  Long-term  fac-
tors.  Labour  productivity generally  increased  more  slowly  in  the  service 
sector  than  in  industry  and  agriculture and  this  can  partly explain  the 
sharp  growth  in  service  employment.  However,  this  does  not  explain  why 
there  were  such  marked  differences  between  employment  trends  in  the  service 
sector  as  between  the  United  States  and  the  Community  and  as  between  the 
Community  countries  themselves.  The  Larger  number  of  rules  and  regulations, 
the  many  obstacles  in particular to  the  setting up  of  new  businesses  and 
the  Less  flexible attitude of  Labour  were  certainly all  factors  contribu-
ting  to  the  considerably  Lower  growth  of  service  employment  in  a  number  of 
Community  countries  as  compared  with  the  United  States.  Another  striking 
phenomenon  is that  the  increase  in  service  employment  in  the  United  States 
was  greatest  in  those  sectors  in  which  there  was  an  above-average  decrease 
in  working  hours  or  in  which  there  was  the  sharpest  increase  in  part-time 
working.  The  European  economies  should  therefore  remove  the  obstacles  to 
increased  employment  in  Labour-intensive  service  industries  as  quickly  as 
possible.  Promoting  the  supply  of  services  and  boosting  job  creation  in  the 
service  industries  would  be  a  Legitimate  component  of  employment  policy, 
even  though  this  would  mean  slower  productivity  growth  in  the  economy  as  a 
whole. 
There  has  been  much  talk  recently  of  the  danger  of  an  acceleration 
in  productivity growth  as  a  result  of  the  increased  use  of  new  technologies 
such  as'  microelectronics  and  computers.  The  use  of  such  technologies  in  the 
next  decade  could  under  certain  circumstances  Lead  to  redundancies  in  in-
dustry,  in  clerical occupations  and  in  a  number  of  service  industries, 
thereby  accentuating  employment  problems  still further.  A call  has  there-
fore  been  made  for  the effects of  technological  progress  on  employment  to 
be  controled  and  restricted so  as  to prevent  technologically  induced  un-
employment  from  becoming  even  greater.  Yet  in  today•s  world  economy  with 
its division of  Labour,  a  return  to  simpler,  more  Labour-intensive  tech-
nologies  is  a  Utopian  solution.  Voluntarily  renouncing  productivity growth 
through  a  policy  of  opposing  technological  progress  and  maintaining 
existing structures  is not  a  viable  way  of  overcoming  employment  problems. 
Such  a  course  would  merely  provide  a  cosmetic  solution to  the  problems  of 
unemployment,  while  creating other,  and  probably  more  serious, difficulties. 
Experience  in  the  United  States  and  Japan  shows  that  it is possible  to  have -~-
not  only  highly  productive  and  competitive  export  and  manufacturing  in-
dustries,  but  also more  rapid  expansion of  Labour-intensive  services. 
Moderating  or  reducing  real  wages 
In  the  academic  and  public  debate,  the  shortage  of  employment  op-
portunities  and  the  current  Level  of  unemployment  are often  blamed  on  ex-
cessively  high  real  wages,  on  the  grounds  that  they  push  up  the  cost  of  the 
production  factor  "labour" disproportionately,  causing  an  increasing  number 
of  jobs  to  be  "rationalized away".  The  facts  show  that  since  1973  most  of 
the  European  industrialized countries  have  "drifted"  into  a  situation of 
very  high  real  wage  levels,  meaning  that  relatively  high  real  wage  increa-' 
ses  continued  to  be  granted  even  after productivity growth  had  suddenly 
slackened  and  massive  oil price  rises  had  produced  a  distinct deteriora-
tion  in  the  terms  of  trade  and  hence  in  the  real  incomes  available  for 
distribution.  The  excessive  increases  in  real  wages  were  not  so  much  the 
result  of  aggressive  trade  union  policies,  but  rather the  consequence, 
first, of  Labour  market  regulation,  rules  against  unfair dismissal  and 
wage  indexation  arrangements  and,  second,  of  underestimating  the  reper-
cussions  of  the oil price  shock  and  of  exchange  rate fluctuations.  The 
wage  adjustment  process  itself has  followed  very  different  patterns  in  the 
industrialized countries. 
For  example,  in  the  United  States  nominal  wages  adjusted only 
sluggishly  because of  multi-year  wage  agreements.  This  meant  that  as  in-
flation accelerated,  real  wages  rose  only  slightly or actually fell.  Some 
European  economies  succeeded  in adjusting  real  wages  to  Less  favourable 
conditions  relatively quickly,  but  others,  even  after the  second oil price 
shock,  continued  to pay  themselves  high  real  wage  increases  thus  further 
damaging  company  profitability. 
Moderating  the  growth  of  real  wages  must  certainly  form  part  of 
any  policy  to  create  jobs  through  increased  investment.  But  today  it has 
almost  become  the  fashion  to see  renunciation of  real  wage  increases  or  a 
pause  in  real  wage  growth  as  the  main  way  out  of  the  employment  crisis. 
This  may  be  a  prescription for  an  individual  country or  group  of  countries 
in order  to stimulate exports.  But  it is doubtful  whether  employment  can 
be  increased  through  general  real  wage  cuts  alone.  Economists  are anything -51-
but  agreed  as  to whether  we  are  now  chiefly suffering  from  "classical  unem-
ployment"  as  a  result  of  excessively  high  real  wages  or  whether  we  have  to 
fight  two  things  simultaneously:  the  shortage  of  new  jobs  due  to  insuffi-
cient  profitability and  "keynesian  unemployment"  due  to  insufficient  aggre-
gate  demand. 
Business  profitability and  hence  business  investment  have  been 
severely  affected  by  a  number  of  factors  during  the  last  ten  years.  Costs 
for  the  production  factor  "labour",  including  soaring  non-wage  costs,  have 
increasingly  taken  on  the  character of  fixed  charges  and  may  thus  have 
deterred  some  firms  from  taking  on  additional  labour.  However,  an  even 
greater obstacle  to  the  unavoidable  structural  adjustment  of  the  European 
economies  is  the  increasing  levelling of  wage  structures,  even  though  the 
need  for  adjustment  has  become  greater as  a  result  of  the  supply  shock, 
changes  in  demand,  the shift  in  relative prices  and  costs  and  technological 
progress.  While  wage  differentials  have  remained  high  in  the  United  States 
and  presumably  increased  further  in  Japan  after the first oil  price  shock, 
wage  differentials as  between  sectors,  regions  and  skills were  eroded 
further  in  most  of  the  European  countries  in  the  1970s.  This  trend  is 
evident  particularly  in  the  service  industries,  which  have  very  different 
and  often disproportionately  low  productivity  levels.  Personal  services 
have  accordingly  often  become  too  expensive,  prompting  consumers  to  switch 
from  labour-intensive services  to capital-intensive,  machine-made  service 
products,  or  to  resort  to  the  underground  economy  and  "do-it-yourself". 
Achieving  greater flexibility  in  working  conditions  and  in  wage  structures 
will  be  one  of  the  most  urgent  tasks  for  economic  policy-makers  in  the 
years  ahead.  This  renders  institutional  reform  of  the price and  wage  for-
mation  process  an  increasing necessity.  Only  through  such  reform  can  the 
conflict  between  macroeconomic  stability and  microeconomic  adjustment  be 
eased. 
There  are  no  quick-acting miracle  cures  for  the  problems  of  employ-
ment.  Nor  can  success  be  expected  from  any  strategy  applied  in  isolation. 
New  and  permanent  jobs  will  be  created  only  through  a  combination  of  sus-
tained  economic  growth,  dynamic  structural  change,  more  efficient  labour 
markets,  including  a  relatively mobile  labour  force,  flexible  and  differen-
tiated wage  settlements,  an  intensified training policy  and  a  sensible 
approach  to  reductions  in  working  hours. -52-
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